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When I was preparing for this panel, I was tempted to begin with something that 
Fritz Kessler, an old contracts teacher at Yale, might have said on this occasion:2 
“Ben, John—wunderful, wunderful, but you couldn’t be wronger!” Nevertheless, I 
cannot really do that now that they have said such nice things about Desiano3—and 
correctly so. I would like to begin with a brief story about Desiano that I had not 
planned to say. When our panel first began deliberating, the other two judges on the 
panel were prepared to come out the opposite way from me. I argued with them 
that, for most of the reasons given by Ben, tort law required that we come out the 
way we did. The other judges on the panel warned me that the Supreme Court 
would reverse us 9–0. I told them, “I don’t give a blank.” I added, “I think I can 
still tell them more about torts than any of them except possibly Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Clarence Thomas, the two members of that Court who know 
something about torts.” (Justice Breyer is a great judge but another Justice used to 
call him the Commissioner because he comes out of administrative law, which has 
a rather different point of view.) “Still,” I went on, “I think I can convince them 
that they cannot reverse us without doing harm to torts in a way that they may not 
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 * Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Sterling Professor 
Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer, Yale Law School. 
 1. This is a slightly revised version of remarks I made at the AALS Torts & 
Compensation Systems panel on Twenty-First Century Tort Law. I am especially grateful to 
Michael Rustad for editing my remarks and providing appropriate footnotes, and to my 
assistant, Susan Lucibelli, and my law clerk, Justin Collings, for their incredible help in 
getting this article ready for publication. 
 2. Friedrich Kessler, one of the grand theorists of contract law, taught at Yale Law 
School first from 1935–1938 and again from 1947–1970. His classic article, Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943), has 
a continuing vitality in contract law scholarship; see also John K. McNulty, A Student’s 
Tribute to Fritz Kessler, 104 YALE L.J. 2133 (1995). 
 3. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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fully appreciate.” And so, it happened, and Desiano is having a good effect on later 
Supreme Court discussions of preemption as well. 
I. POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH CIVIL RECOURSE 
But even apart from that, there are some things, I hate to say it, that I agree with 
John and Ben about. But there are things with which I do disagree seriously. In 
their 2010 Texas Law Review article, Goldberg and Zipursky blame accident law 
for creating the gravitational pull away from individual justice accounts of tort 
law.4 They contend that the fundamental dichotomy in American tort law is private 
wrongs versus the “allocation of accidentally caused losses.”5 First, I agree with 
them that tort law is not just about accident law and that tort law is much broader 
than accident law and covers a variety of different things.6 If one only looks at 
accident law, one does not understand torts.7 I also agree that, at any given moment, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 929 (2010) [hereinafter Torts as Wrongs]; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 657, 747 (2001); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 
VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002). 
 5. Torts as Wrongs, supra note 4, at 919. 
 6. Torts is not unidimensional, nor is accident law only about the allocation of loss. See 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970) 
[hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS] (acknowledging the need to consider individual 
views of what seems just and not economic considerations only); see generally Guido 
Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts—The Case of Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT 
LAW (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) [hereinafter The Complexity of Torts] (arguing that torts 
is not one dimensional but fulfills multiple functions as evidenced by punitive damages’ role 
in (1) enforcing social norms through the use of private attorneys general, (2) fulfilling a 
deterrent role by punitive damages’ multiplier role, (3) the Tragic Choice function as 
reflected in the Ford Pinto products liability case, (4) enabling recovery of generally 
nonrecoverable compensatory damages, and (5) permitting the righting of public wrongs); cf. 
Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 743 (2005) (explaining four 
functions of tort law as I saw them to be when I wrote The Costs of Accidents: “(1) the 
reduction of the sum of accident costs and of safety costs; (2) distributional equity; (3) 
achieving most effectively the desired degree of interpersonal and intertemporal spreading; 
and, (4) the minimization of the administrative costs of achieving (1), (2), and (3)”); John 
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364 
(2005) (arguing that The Cost of Accidents was about primary cost reduction rather than the 
norms of responsibility). 
 7. The law of torts performs multiple functions in society, and that explains in large 
part diverse perspectives in law and legal scholarship.  
Which of these approaches is law and legal scholarship? I believe that each of 
them has much to be said for it. Indeed, I have myself done studies which, I 
think, partake significantly of every one of them. It is also not impossible to 
engage in complex mixtures of them, and the insights of each can be of 
considerable help in filling out the gaps in—the criticisms that can 
appropriately be made of—all of them. Nevertheless, they each do represent 
widely differing ways of viewing laws, legislatures, courts, legal scholarship, 
and the role these should play in society and in the making of society’s rules. 
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one of the things that one does as a judge, as a decider of the particular case, is 
something that is not that different from civil recourse.8 That is, in the individual 
case as a judge, one looks to whether an individual has been injured by a wrong in 
a way that requires recourse. That’s one of the things that judges do in individual 
cases. I further think, however, that, in any given case, torts is also about giving 
someone compensation from somewhere, somehow, because that someone 
“deserves” compensation, that is, has a corrective justice right to it. The 
Colemaniacal approach has something to it in an individual case as well, but that 
doesn’t mean that there isn’t also a civil recourse side to what is going on.9 I will 
come back to what, if anything, that civil recourse side means later in this Article. 
II. CRITIQUE OF CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY 
A. How Does Something Become a Civil Wrong? 
What I don’t think either the Colemaniacs or the Goldzurskies at all explain 
adequately is how or why something becomes a civil wrong.10 How or why does 
something become a legal wrong that requires civil recourse? In fact, there is 
nothing original about this comment; I had written this down, and then I found 
Barbara Fried’s article which says “[t]he literature either is silent on what makes an 
act wrongful in the first place or suggests criteria that seem indistinguishable from 
some version of cost/benefit analysis.”11 That is, in some of their own writings 
when they try to say why something should be a civil wrong, John and Ben suggest 
reasons that look much like sophisticated Posnerian, that is, Calabresian, law and 
economics, plus compensation et al. reasons. Now, I do not want to be too harsh 
about this. After all, Aristotle told us that there is corrective justice, but he did not 
tell us what it was.12 Moreover, Blackstone told us things very like what the 
Goldzurskies are saying, but even he did not tell us what those wrongs were.13 So 
                                                                                                                 
Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the 
Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2151 (2003). 
 8.  “Generally speaking, courts are unlikely to be reductionist. Judges derive law from 
many sources. The problem arises from the ever-increasing incursions by federal courts into 
the tort process, and is worsened when the incursion is by the Supreme Court.” The 
Complexity of Torts, supra note 6, at 333 (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s reduction of 
the multiple functions of punitive damages to the single factor of retributory justice). 
 9. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Jules Coleman, 
Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982) (explaining corrective 
justice theory of tort law). 
 10. See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse 
Revisited, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 341 (2011); Torts as Wrongs, supra note 4. 
 11. Barbara H. Fried, The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to Torts, 18 LEGAL 
THEORY 231, 231 (2012). 
 12. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 403 (1992) (noting 
that Aristotle coined the term “corrective justice”). 
 13. Sir William Blackstone published Commentaries on the Laws of England from 
1765–1769. Volume III of the Commentaries, entitled Private Wrongs, covers the tort law of 
the mid-eighteenth century. See John H. Langbein, Introduction to Book III, in 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES iii (photo. reprint 1979) (describing private wrongs that 
prefigure intentional torts); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort 
452 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:449 
 
they are all in good company; Coleman is in good company, and John and Ben are 
in good company as well.  
B. Civil Recourse Theory’s Circularity 
In a macro or fundamental sense, much of what John and Ben say is circular. Let 
me just take a couple of steps back on that. I still teach torts. I’ve taught it since 
1959. It is the one course I have taught every year since and continue to teach from 
8:30 to 10:00 every morning when I am not in New York judging. I begin the first 
class by asking: “What is a tort?” That is: “What is a civil wrong that gives rise to 
recourse to a particular person?” That’s the first question I ask. And I get a variety 
of answers from my students like, “Well, there has to be an injury,” and then I say 
something about trespass. Or, “There has to be this,” and then I ask them why 
recovery is not given in situations that look very similar to that. I go through many 
of these things and ask again: “What is it that gives rise to recourse?” I end the first 
class by saying that this is a serious subject. I tell my students that in contracts they 
will be asking what a contract is throughout the whole term. Here, we will go on 
and read cases and hopefully at the end of the term they will get some idea as to 
why we sometimes do and sometimes do not give recovery. Why do we say there is 
a duty sometimes (and I am traditional enough to begin with the four classic 
elements and what they mean: duty, breach, causation, and damages) and not at 
other times?14 This is the fundamental question for tort law. And it is not just 
                                                                                                                 
Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 
560 (2005) (“With certain heresies excised, the Commentaries provided the basic text for 
late-colonial and early-American legal education and practice. American jurists were thus 
quite familiar with the principle that government owes its citizens laws and institutions for 
declaring and vindicating basic rights, including the right to a law for the redress of 
wrongs.”). 
 14. Compare Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., 594 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding 
manufacturer liable for death of teenager from sniffing PAM, a non-stick spray used in 
cooking, because manufacturer was aware of a large number of prior similar deaths and 
injuries), Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (finding it to be 
foreseeable that an unwarned mother would use highly toxic furniture polish and an infant 
would drink it and be poisoned), Bigbee v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983) 
(holding that the telephone company owed a duty to a customer in locating the telephone 
booth too close to a busy Los Angeles street where plaintiff was struck by a drunk driver), 
Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that real estate 
brokers have an affirmative duty to inspect homes that they sell and must disclose all 
material facts affecting property values), Ollison v. Weinberg Racing Ass’n, 688 P.2d 847 
(Or. Ct. App. 1984) (imposing dram shop liability on racetrack that celebrated fan 
appreciation night by selling beer at its concession stand for less than half the usual price), 
and Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984) (recognizing a child’s cause 
of action for negligent loss of parental consortium), with THC Holdings Corp. v. Tishman, 
Nos. 93 Civ. 5393 (KMW), 95 Civ. 4422, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8538, 1998 WL 305639 
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1998) (holding no special relationship existed between investment bank 
and corporate client giving rise to tort-based duty independent of parties’ contractual 
obligations), Holdampf v. A.C. & S., Inc., 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005) (holding that the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey owed no duty of care to the wife of an employee 
exposed to asbestos while laundering her husband’s clothing), Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that a manufacturer of firearms owed no duty 
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theorists like Posner and Calabresi who ask questions of a sort different from the 
ones that John and Ben ask; it is lawmakers, including high courts, which seek to 
give reasons for why there should be a civil wrong in some circumstances and not 
in others.15 
Let’s look at Holmes v. Mather,16 going back to old chestnuts, the case that 
established fault as a requirement for recovery even where there was a direct hit 
injury.17 Actually, it didn’t; it was all in dicta. In Holmes, the defendant’s servants 
were driving a team of horses in double harness on a public highway. The servants 
lost control of the team and they injured a pedestrian using a public street.18 Baron 
Bramwell, in deciding this case against the plaintiff, faced the argument, “Why 
should the innocent plaintiff suffer rather than the defendant who chose to exercise 
his horses on a public street?” To which Baron Bramwell answered, “For the 
convenience of mankind in carrying on the affairs of life, people as they go along 
roads must expect, or put up with, such mischief as reasonable care on the part of 
others cannot avoid.”19 
Neither of these arguments really gets one very far because the plaintiff also 
chose to go out on the street. Or, she could have gone on the street but chosen to 
wear iron-plated underwear and not been injured even if struck by the horses. And, 
what is the convenience of mankind? Baron Bramwell, a pupil of Ricardo,20 was 
                                                                                                                 
to persons harmed by their misuse), Purdy v. Pub. Adm’r, 526 N.E.2d 4, 7 (N.Y. 1988) 
(noting that “common law in the State of New York does not impose a duty to control the 
conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing injury to others . . . . This is so . . . 
even where ‘as a practical matter’ defendant could have exercised such control”), Becker v. 
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (declining to recognize an action for wrongful life), 
and Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959) (holding that the defendant was not liable for 
encouraging another to jump into a pit and then refusing to help him escape drowning). 
 15. As the New York Court of Appeals states: “It is well established that before a 
defendant may be held liable for negligence it must be shown that the defendant owes a duty 
to the plaintiff.” Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1976). The New York Court of 
Appeals, the highest court of New York, offers tort teaching lessons as to when something is 
or is not a duty. It is “the responsibility of courts, in fixing the orbit of duty, ‘to limit the 
legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree’ and to protect against crushing 
exposure to liability.” Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
 16. [1875] 10 L.R. Exch. 261 (Eng.). 
 17. In England the requirement of fault in cases of direct injury to plaintiffs by 
defendants is generally dated to Baron Bramwell’s opinion in Holmes, 10 L.R. Exch. 261. In 
many of the states of the United States the requirement was imposed earlier. The opinion 
most frequently cited is that of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw in Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 
Cush.) 292 (1850).  
 18. Because servants were driving the team, the injury was not, in fact, “direct.” “The 
dictum provides some reason to believe that Bramwell considered highway collisions to be 
exceptional in requiring fault, and hence strict liability still to be the general rule.” Ken 
Oliphant, Rylands v Fletcher and the Emergence of Enterprise Liability in the Common Law, 
in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004, at 81, 106 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 
2004) (discussing the dicta in Holmes v. Mather). 
 19. Holmes, 10 L.R. Exch. at 267. 
 20. “David Ricardo (1772–1823), a student of James Mill, is a pivotal figure in the 
history of economic thought” and was a leading utilitarian. MARK PERLMAN & CHARLES R. 
MCCANN JR., THE PILLARS OF ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING: IDEAS AND TRADITIONS 263–64 
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referring to a particular utilitarian theory at the time. The deeper question is: Which 
choices were more important? Which choices were more feasible?21 
C. What Civil Recourse Theory Does Not Explain 
Nevertheless, we do not have to go back too far to see how courts ask questions 
different from those asked by the civil recourse theorists. It is not strange that the 
New York Court of Appeals should have talked as it did in Lauer v. City of New 
York.22 The New York Court of Appeals in that great decision on duty said that the 
question of duty is a question that is retained by the highest court of the state and 
must be decided based on a series of factors that have little to do with a particular 
person’s right to civil recourse. The factors the court speaks of are deterrence, 
spreading, and economic effects. I have my students read Lauer and then kind of 
laugh when they say: “It looks like Calabresi’s Costs of Accidents; it looks like the 
things that you wrote should be looked at.” In other words, the court in Lauer 
seemingly held that the question of duty must be decided based on factors that have 
little—perhaps too little—to do with civil recourse.  
The question of what establishes a wrong is something civil recourse theorists 
do not deal with adequately. Nevertheless, I do think that civil recourse theorists do 
have an insight into something that is missing in the discussion of justice, if justice 
is viewed solely as the reduction of the sum of accident and safety costs and things 
of that sort. And I will come back to it. But I also think that what they do does not 
explain an awful lot of cases. Conversely, I think I can (in my broad view of torts) 
explain pretty much all of the cases they discuss in their Texas Law Review article 
and all the other civil recourse articles as well.23 For example, I have a very good 
explanation for the whole issue of emotional damages. To me, it is still the only 
explanation that makes sense of that difficult area.24 But then, that is often how I 
see the world—from a Guido-centered point of view. 
There are any number of things in the law of torts that may strike one as strange. 
Why is it that in New York there is a duty to everyone who is foreseeable when 
                                                                                                                 
(1998) (discussing David Ricardo’s utilitarianism as “steeped in the Utilitarianism of 
Bentham and James Mill”). 
 21. Chris Goodrich, a sometime law student, recalls some of the lessons of the Holmes 
v. Mather tort story:  
Guido quoted his all-time favorite case, in which England’s Baron Bramwell, 
rather like his contemporary Holmes, found against a pedestrian struck by a 
carriage. “‘For the convenience of mankind in carrying on the affairs of life, 
people as they go along roads must expect, or put up with, such mischief as 
reasonable care on the part of others cannot avoid.’ . . . Wake up, you shouldn’t 
be asleep yet!” . . . Guido played the class as if it were speed chess, responding 
instantly to each student’s comment and calling just as quickly on someone 
else. 
CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW 
SCHOOL 78–79 (1991). 
 22. 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000). 
 23. See Torts as Wrongs, supra note 4. 
 24. For a preliminary description of that explanation, see GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, 
BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 
(1985). 
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there is a product defect and there is not a duty to everyone that is foreseeable when 
there is negligence? That is very odd, and I do not think that civil recoursers say 
much about that. 
Another example: I am injured by a taxicab and seventy percent of the taxicabs 
in town are owned by Goldberg and thirty percent by Coldberg. I sue Goldberg and 
say, “I was hit by a taxicab and I can show more probably than not that it was 
yours. I can do this because you own seventy percent of the cabs.” I am thrown out 
of court. Such a case never gets to a jury. And it isn’t just the existence of statistics 
or the chance of error that dooms the case. I am hit by a taxicab, which has a sign 
on it identifying the owner. All of the taxicabs in town are owned by Goldberg or 
Coldberg. The issue is, did the sign have a G or C on it? We do a test to see how 
often at the appropriate distance and speed I can correctly distinguish a C from a G. 
If I can do this correctly seventy percent of the time, I will invariably get to a jury 
and presumably win.  
In each case, I have been injured and I can show more probably than not that the 
defendant caused the injury. The difference between the cases is, of course, easy to 
explain from an economic point of view. Charging a company that has seventy 
percent of the cabs one hundred percent of the time is wrong, while doing it in the 
statistical identification case comes out right.25 It does not come out right in any 
given case (pace civil recoursers), but in terms of allocation of costs it comes out 
right over time. 
Yet another example: Why, if I have a right to recourse when I have been 
injured by you, is there no liability where there is no causal tendency? You are 
speeding. Because you are speeding, your car happens to be under a tree that, 
falling, hits the car; I am injured in the car. In this classic case, there is no recovery, 
and yet you injured me by your wrong. There is no question about this result in 
ordinary accident law.26 Now, civil recoursers might say, “Oh, well, that is just a 
very unusual situation in accident law; it is just an odd quirk.”  
But remember, we are talking about torts, not just accident law. And if we move 
to fraud, this odd case becomes a fundamental part of the law. That is, to recover, 
one needs to show loss causation as well as transaction causation.27 A plaintiff in a 
securities fraud case cannot satisfy loss causation without evidence of an 
economically relevant causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See generally Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the 
Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986) (discussing the problem of probabilistic 
proof). 
 26. See Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899). 
 27. See, e.g., Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, 
J., concurring) (explaining the distinction between loss causation and transaction causation); 
see also Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that 
a plaintiff in a securities fraud case had to prove “loss causation—that the 
misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic harm—and transaction causation—
that the violations in question caused the appellant to engage in the transaction in question”). 
But see Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (“‘Loss 
causation’ is an exotic name—perhaps an unhappy one . . . for the standard rule of tort law 
that the plaintiff must allege and prove that, but for the defendant’s wrongdoing, the plaintiff 
would not have incurred the harm of which he complains.” (citation omitted)). 
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and the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff. There must be a causal tendency. 
For example, but for the defendant’s misrepresentation that this was a good 
neighborhood, I would not have bought a house—I would have spent my money on 
wine, women, and song. Nevertheless, if the house is later destroyed by a 
hurricane, which hit good and bad neighborhoods alike, there is no economically 
relevant, causal connection between the defendant’s misrepresentation and the 
economic loss I have suffered. There is no loss causation, and I do not recover. 
There is no recovery because there is no economic nexus between the defendant’s 
fraud and the plaintiff’s loss.28 In terms of civil recourse, such cases do not fit well, 
but, in terms of broader notions of economic allocation, they make a lot of sense.  
There are situations where the causal-tendency or loss-causation requirement 
does not apply. These are usually contractual—but may be statutory—situations. 
The classic is the insurance contract. I lie about my health to an insurance 
company, and, if I had not lied, the company would not have sold me the insurance. 
A car then hits me. My injuries have nothing to do with what I lied to the insurer 
about. But I lose nevertheless. In this case, loss causation is not necessary; 
transaction causation is enough. There are, I believe, good economic reasons for 
this exception to the usual loss-causation requirement, and they have nothing to do 
with civil recourse. 
I could go on to many other examples, which I do not think, even at a 
microlevel, are explained by civil recourse theory. My main point, however, 
remains the same: civil recourse does not explain the underlying reason why 
something is or is not a wrong. 
D. Civil Recourse and Products Liability 
I have one side point, which I want to make because my view of products 
liability is often misstated, as I believe it is in John and Ben’s article on products 
liability responding to Polinsky and Shavell.29 When I say, “put strict liability on 
the best decision maker in products liability,” I am not saying, “put liability on the 
injurer.”30 As often as not, the best decision maker is the victim.31 I believe one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. “Loss causation connects the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission and the 
plaintiff’s economic loss. . . . The mere purchase of a security at an inflated price does not by 
itself prove loss causation.” Randy C. Joshi, Catherine F. Madrid & Lee-Anne V. 
Mulholland, Causation Issues and Expert Testimony, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: 
THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 3 10 (Roman L. Weil, Daniel G. Lentz & David P. 
Hoffman eds., 5th ed. 2012). Cf. “Loss causation requires the plaintiff show that the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions resulted in the claimed losses to the plaintiff—a 
foreseeability or a proximate cause requirement.” ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 375 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
 29. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products 
Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 
1943 (2010). 
 30. “[M]anufacturers are not absolute insurers of their products. Strict liability will not 
impose legal responsibility simply because a product causes harm. A product must be 
defective as marketed if liability is to attach, and ‘defective’ must mean something more 
than a condition causing physical injury.” Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 
(Alaska 1979) (footnotes omitted). The burden is placed on the manufacturer when the 
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does not understand current products liability law unless one understands that 
frequently it is the “first party” who is the “least cost avoider/best decider.”32  
In this respect, moreover, I believe that the whole interplay of doctrines like 
assumption of risk, warning, and definition of a design defect represents a different 
approach from that raised by the question of whether any given product is too 
dangerous.33 The approach to product defect based on the reasonableness or 
dangerousness of the product was adopted by the American Law Institute in the 
Restatement (Third).34 As I see it, both approaches, both complex calculi, are there 
in the law of products liability and reflect the way courts actually decide these 
cases.35 Thus, the issue is not just whether a product is defective or reasonably safe. 
                                                                                                                 
victims were powerless to protect themselves.  
As Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court explained: “The 
reasons justifying strict liability emphasize that there is something wrong, if not 
in the manufacturer’s manner of production, at least in his product . . . A 
bottling company is liable for the injury caused by a decomposing mouse found 
in its bottle. It is not liable for whatever harm results to the consumer’s teeth 
from the sugar in its beverage. A knife manufacturer is not liable when the user 
cuts himself with one of its knives. When the injury is in no way attributable to 
a defect there is no basis for strict liability.” 
Id. at 879 (alternation in original) (quoting Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of 
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366–67 (1965)). 
 31. “Where an injury is caused by a risk or a misuse of the product which was not 
reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer and supplier, they are not liable.” Smith ex rel. 
Smith v. Bryco Arms, 33 P.3d 638, 645 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the manufacturer 
was not liable for a company’s unauthorized modifications to a handgun’s design). Civil 
recourse theory’s inordinate emphasis on the bilateral relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant does not explain why courts sometimes place the burden on the defendant 
manufacturer and sometimes on the injured plaintiff. See generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. 
Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) (explaining 
that courts consider factors such as the victim’s knowledge of the risk and whether the 
plaintiff could have avoided the injury; that is, which party was in the best position to avoid 
the accident risk (was the least cost avoider/best decider), the manufacturer or the injured 
plaintiff). This question draws its answer from doctrines like assumption of risk and those 
defining product defect. See generally THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 6 (developing 
theory that the sum of accident and safety costs may be minimized by placing liability on the 
“least cost avoider”).  
 32. Thus, courts regularly instruct juries on whether a plaintiff’s misuse of the product 
was reasonably foreseeable or not in causing the plaintiff’s damages. 
 33. Cf. Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This formulation 
of the risk-utility test is an ‘integrated’ test . . . . Under this formulation, consumer 
expectations are included within the scope of the broader risk-utility test. In addition, the test 
refines the consumer-expectation factor by specifically allowing for advertising and 
marketing messages to be used to assess consumer expectations.” (quoting Mikolajczyk v. 
Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352 (Ill. 2008))). 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998) (defining a 
product as “defective in design if the foreseeable risks of harm could have been reduced by a 
reasonable alternative design is based on the common-sense notion that liability for harm 
caused by product designs should attach only when harm is reasonably preventable”). 
 35.  
When Jon Hirschoff and I set out to write Toward A Test for Strict Liability 
in Torts, we had, I think, several objectives in mind. The first was to point out 
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Rather, courts also consider whether a product is defective when sold for a 
particular use, thereby considering user conduct and expected user conduct, both of 
which may turn on how the product was marketed or advertised.36  
                                                                                                                 
the fundamental difference between cost-benefit based tests for liability (such 
as the Learned Hand Fault test) and tests (such as the one we called the Strict 
Liability test) in which the decisionmaker eschewed cost-benefit judgments. 
Second, we wished to point out that the recent move to strict liability in torts 
could not be explained predominantly on wealth distribution or spreading 
grounds, as was commonly stated, but was likely to stem from dissatisfaction 
with the meager accomplishments of fault type tests in reducing the sum of 
accident and safety costs. 
Third, we wanted to emphasize the importance of practical over theoretical 
issues in determining which approach to tort liability ought to predominate. In 
particular, we wanted to explore the effect that (a) the level of generality at 
which a liability rule worked best, (b) the existence of insurance, and (c) the 
presence of third party victims, would have on whether fault or strict liability 
tests were likely to be most effective in achieving optimal degrees of safety. 
Fourth, we hoped to give courts some guidance in product liability cases by 
helping them see how strict product liability fit with older examples of non-
fault liability (such as extra hazardous activity liability and assumption of risk), 
and how they might approach the question of whom to hold strictly liable. 
Finally, we wished to indicate the relationships and tensions between those goals 
which focused on yielding an optimal degree of safety and other goals . . . . 
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 
1501 (1991) (commentary by Guido Calabresi).  
 36. See, e.g., Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, 
J.) (applying New York law and ruling that a jury should have been instructed on consumer 
expectations under warranty law in addition to the risk/utility instruction in strict products 
liability because a turkey pan with handles that were too small was widely advertised on 
television and created a consumer expectation: “The jury could have found that the roasting 
pan’s overall utility for cooking low-volume foods outweighed the risk of injury when 
cooking heavier foods, but that the product was nonetheless unsafe for the purpose for which 
it was marketed and sold—roasting a twenty-five pound turkey—and, as such, was defective 
under the consumer expectations test. That being so, the appellants were entitled to a 
separate breach of warranty charge.”). 
In Castro, 
the product was designed, marketed, and sold as a multiple-use product. The 
pan was originally manufactured and sold in France as an all-purpose cooking 
dish without handles. And at trial, the jury saw a videotape of a QVC 
representative demonstrating to the television audience that the pan, in addition 
to serving as a suitable roaster for a twenty-five pound turkey, could also be 
used to cook casseroles, cutlets, cookies, and other low-volume foods. The 
court charged the jury that “[a] product is defective if it is not reasonably safe[,] 
[t]hat is, if the product is so likely to be harmful to persons that a reasonable 
person who had actual knowledge of its potential for producing injury would 
conclude that it should not have been marketed in that condition.” And, so 
instructed, the jury presumably found that the pan, because it had many 
advantages in a variety of uses, did not fail the risk/utility test.  
 But it was also the case that the pan was advertised as suitable for a 
particular use—cooking a twenty-five pound turkey. Indeed, T-Fal added 
handles to the pan in order to fill QVC’s request for a roasting pan that it could 
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Sometimes courts adopt unfortunate or incomplete terms like “consumer 
expectations” or “assumption of risk” to justify a finding of defect vel non. But this 
occasional judicial sloppiness does not alter the fact that whether the plaintiff or 
defendant is better placed to decide between safety and harm remains a 
fundamental way (along with “product reasonableness”) in which these cases are 
decided.37 
But whether one follows the Restatement (Third)’s or my more complex 
approach, the fact remains that civil recourse does not adequately deal with the core 
questions of products liability law. It does not consider the level of risk that 
defendant manufacturer and victim must bear. 38 And it does not explain, at either 
                                                                                                                 
use in its Thanksgiving promotion. The product was, therefore, sold as 
appropriately used for roasting a twenty-five pound turkey. And it was in that 
use that allegedly the product failed and injured the appellant. 
Id. (alternations in original) (footnote omitted). 
 37. In the strict liability context, the term “defect” is “neither self-defining nor 
susceptible to a single definition applicable in all contexts.” Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 
P.2d 443, 453 (Cal. 1978).  
The varied purposes and the theoretical underpinnings of implied warranty and 
strict liability in tort have generated five main tests for product defectiveness: 
(1) the “deviation from the norm” test; (2) the “reasonable fitness for intended 
purpose” test; (3) the Restatement test; (4) the “risk/utility analysis” test; and 
(5) the recent test proposed by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull 
Engineering Co. . . . . 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alaska 1979) (footnotes omitted). The 
American Law Institute’s section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted a 
“consumer-expectation” test in design cases:  
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
 (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. . . . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability has adopted a design-defect test which provides that a design defect 
occurs 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the 
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of 
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998); see also id. § 2 cmt. d 
(“Industry practice may also be relevant to whether the omission of an alternative design 
rendered the product not reasonably safe.”). 
 38.  
Strict products liability evolved from two separate bases: implied warranty and 
strict liability in tort. . . . [S]everal policy considerations have been at work [in 
combining these concepts]. First, greater efficiency and justice [is] achieved by 
eliminating the necessity for plaintiffs to prove fault by manufacturers of 
defective products. Section [sic], frustration of consumer expectation [is] 
still . . . the underlying basis of recovery. Third, incidence of harm from unsafe 
products [is] reduced by imposing strict liability and thus providing an 
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the macro- or microlevel, how courts decide when it is the manufacturer or the 
victim who must bear the burden of a devastating products injury.39 Civil recourse 
is limited by its focus on the relational interests between the manufacturer and 
victim, and hence does not consider tort law’s heterogeneity and the complex set of 
reasons that leads to the placing of certain burdens, but only some such burdens, on 
manufacturers who put products on the market.40 
                                                                                                                 
incentive to produce safer products. Fourth, risks [are] allocated and losses 
spread by requiring a manufacturing enterprise to accept responsibility in strict 
liability for harm attributable to a defect in its product. The concept of risk 
allocation [is] the primary policy rationale convincing courts to adopt strict 
products liability. 
Caterpillar, 593 P.2d at 877 (footnotes omitted). 
 39. “The purpose of imposing such strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer is to 
insure [sic] that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who 
are powerless to protect themselves.” Id. at 878 (emphasis added) (quoting Clary v. Fifth 
Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969)). 
 40. The New York Court of Appeals acknowledges that complex products liability cases 
often involve larger policy issues which go beyond the injured plaintiff and the 
manufacturer: 
Today as never before the product in the hands of the consumer is often a 
most sophisticated and even mysterious article. . . . In today’s world it is often 
only the manufacturer who can fairly be said to know and to understand when 
an article is suitably designed and safely made for its intended purpose. Once 
floated on the market, many articles in a very real practical sense defy detection 
of defect, except possibly in the hands of an expert after laborious and perhaps 
even destructive disassembly. . . .  
Consideration of the economics of production and distribution point in the 
same direction. We take as a highly desirable objective the widest feasible 
availability of useful, nondefective products. We know that in many, if not 
most instances, today this calls for mass production, mass advertising, mass 
distribution. It is this mass system which makes possible the development and 
availability of the benefits which may flow from new inventions and new 
discoveries. Justice and equity would dictate the apportionment across the 
system of all related costs—of production, of distribution, of postdistribution 
liability. Obviously, if manufacturers are to be held for financial losses of 
nonusers, the economic burden will ultimately be passed on in part, if not in 
whole, to the purchasing users. But considerations of competitive disadvantage 
will delay or dilute automatic transferral of such added costs. Whatever the 
total cost it will then be borne by those in the system, the producer, the 
distributor and the consumer. Pressures will converge on the manufacturer, 
however, who alone has the practical opportunity, as well as a considerable 
incentive, to turn out useful, attractive, but safe products. To impose this 
economic burden on the manufacturer should encourage safety in design and 
production . . . . 
Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627–28 (N.Y. 1973). “The problem with strict liability of 
products has been one of limitation. No one wants absolute liability where all the article has 
to do is to cause injury. . . . Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive knowledge 
of the condition of the product.” Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 
1974) (footnote omitted). Every products liability case requires the court to consider who 
had the better knowledge of a flaw and therefore was in the best position to avoid the 
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III. TOWARD TORT LAW’S PLACE IN A LARGER LIABILITY SYSTEM 
Well, what then is tort law? What leads courts in deciding individual tort cases 
to do some of those things that John and Ben talk about? First, I do not think that it 
is correct to think of tort law in contradistinction to contract and criminal law on 
the basis of civil recourse theory. To do so I think understates the significance of 
torts. That is, what distinguishes torts is that it is a subset of a broader area, the area 
of law governed by what I have called liability rules.41 Contract law covers the area 
in which entitlements shift through negotiations between people. Criminal law and 
administrative law are areas where entitlements shift through the collective decision 
of the state. There is also, however, a different area where entitlements (what is 
mine and what is yours) shift by letting people pay (or take a chance of doing 
something that will cause them to pay) a collectively determined price. It is not 
contract because the “price” in this middle area is set by the state and not by the 
parties. It is not criminal law or administrative law for these areas of law determine 
collectively in what circumstances something is yours or something is mine. It 
occupies the vast middle ground between contract law and administrative and 
criminal law. 
The more libertarian a society is, the more it uses contract law. The more 
collectivist a society is, the more it uses administrative and criminal law. A 
characteristic of our modern society that shows that it is ideologically socially 
democratic is that we use this middle ground where contract might work. And we 
use it when administrative and criminal law also might work. In other words, we 
choose the middle way when we could govern in other ways. We do it because we 
want to use the middle ground. Products liability is a good example of one area 
where both other approaches are available and feasible, but where we choose to use 
this middle ground. 
Incidentally, the great Leon Lipson,42 one of the most brilliant people I have 
known, said, when I described this middle ground to him: “If you look at who the 
great legal philosophers of the West were in the nineteenth century, they all came 
out of contracts. By contrast, if you look at who the great legal philosophers were 
in the so-called Socialist countries [whose law was his field], they all came out of 
criminal law. I wonder whether the next generation of philosophers in the West will 
                                                                                                                 
product injury. 
 41. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 42.  
Professor Lipson specialized in the fields of space law and Soviet law. He 
coauthored for NASA the book-length Report on the Law of Outer Space, and 
also contributed an entry on the subject to the International Encyclopedia of 
Social Sciences. In later years he focused particularly on various aspects of 
Soviet law, especially the administration of justice, informal law and the 
rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism. Among his numerous publications were two 
coedited volumes: “Papers on Soviet Law” and “Law and the Social Sciences” 
with Yale Law School colleague Stanton Wheeler. 
Obituary, Leon Lipson, YALE BULL. & CALENDAR (Sept. 30–Oct. 7, 1996), http://www.yale. 
edu/opa/arc-ybc/ybc/v25.n6.obit.html. 
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come out of torts and eminent domain, will come from these middle area 
subjects.”43  
I view torts in this way. I view it as an area whose principal characteristic is the 
use of collectively set prices. It is an area where, for some reason, we think it 
worthwhile to use a liability rule—but not through state payments, as is usually the 
case in eminent domain. We use it, rather, by giving individuals the right to receive 
that collectively set price from those who have taken their entitlements. That is, the 
liability rule is employed by giving individuals a right to civil recourse.  
This means that for me the essence of torts would remain even if we got rid of 
torts as we know it and moved to a total New Zealand-style compensation system.44 
We then would not have the private, relational part of torts, but “torts” would still 
occupy the middle ground between contracts and criminal/administrative law as a 
way of dealing with the shifting of ownership and entitlements. As such, it would 
retain its key place within the whole structure of law. If you are interested in 
learning more about this, it is in a book that I never wrote. I wrote the little article, 
One View of the Cathedral,45 that sets up the book; then I wrote my Texas Law 
Review article on The Law of the Mixed Society46 in 1978, which took the next step 
in the project. I thought I was going to write a book about this but turned instead to 
another book, Tragic Choices.47 As a result, the whole discussion of the place of 
torts in our legal system was never fully spelled out. 
One point about this middle ground that torts occupies is especially worth 
making. It goes to the size of the collectively set price through which entitlements 
can be shifted. Scholars often assume that the liability-rule price—the collectively 
set price—should seek to mirror, to approximate, what the pure-market price would 
be. But this should only be so if the reason for using the middle ground is to try to 
come as close to a free-market result as is feasible in the circumstance. And that, as 
I just noted, may not be the object where the middle ground is used for social-
democratic ideological reasons rather than for feasibility ones. Conversely, some 
think that the collectively set price must be such as to make the shift in entitlement 
as difficult as possible in order to deter undesirable conduct. In other words, these 
people seek to have the liability rule bring about a result that approaches the one 
that administrative and criminal law would seek to achieve. But this too is wrong. It 
only would be correct if the middle ground were being used because administrative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Conversation with Leon Lipson, R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law 
School, in New Haven, Ct. 
 44. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 632 
(1985) (“The New Zealand Royal Commission first proposed a broad-based financing 
mechanism. It envisioned a flat levy on all employers of one-percent of wages and salaries 
because ‘[a]ll industrial activity is interdependent and there should be a general pooling of 
all the risks of accidents to workers.’ As enacted, however, the legislation provided for both 
(1) ‘classifications and rates of levy’ that vary by occupation or industry, as well as (2) 
individual firm-level penalties and rebates. Both of these devices, at least in principle, could 
further Professor Calabresi’s cost internalization goals.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 45. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 41. 
 46. Guido Calabresi, Torts—The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519 (1978). 
 47. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
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or criminal law was—for whatever reason—not feasible or too costly to employ in 
that area. 
If instead the liability rule is being used because a middle ground is 
ideologically desired, if it is applied in order to further partially collective—social 
democratic—goals in the transfer of entitlements, then the collective price, the 
liability that must be borne, will be set at a level that furthers these goals. It may be 
that the society wishes entitlements to be transferred easily at below market prices, 
or it may be that the society wants them shifted only if the taker is willing to pay 
more than the market ordains. In fact, the liability rule, the collective price, can—
and regularly does—reflect these collective values.48 And the common existence of 
these nonmarket price-liability rules seems to me to underscore the importance of 
this middle area of the law. It signals, dramatically, torts’s role in our legal system, 
totally apart from any possible civil recourse and corrective justice functions. 
IV. THE ROLE OF CIVIL RECOURSE 
What is there, then, to the civil recourse point of view? I think there is a fair 
amount. Once some people are given the right to recovery, for any number of 
reasons (like “this is a good way of reducing the sum of accident and safety costs,” 
“this is a good way of spreading accident costs,” or any of the things that the New 
York Court of Appeals talked about in Lauer49 and in Palka50), then situations will 
have been created in which individuals in other cases are going to ask, “Why not 
me?” The economics may not be the same; the original reasons for plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Obvious examples include areas of tort law in which less than full compensation is 
given for damage suffered (for instance, emotional damages) and areas of torts in which 
extra-compensatory damages are given, neither for multiplier nor for vengeance reasons. See 
supra note 6. But similar instances can be found in eminent domain. At one time in Italy, 
compensation for takings was set at “value in use” rather than at the usually much higher 
market value, thereby facilitating the shift of ownership away from traditional landowning 
classes. (I know this all too well as a descendant of “losers” in such transfers.) 
Conversely, the fury that followed the use of eminent domain in Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) might have been avoided if the collective price set for the 
takings had been at two or three times the supposed market price. 
 49. Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000). 
 50. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 193 (N.Y. 1994) 
(“Courts traditionally and as part of the common-law process fix the duty point by balancing 
factors, including the reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the 
proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate 
risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of 
new channels of liability.”); see also Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 42 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (“New York’s highest court expressly reserved a delicate balancing test for itself 
and for courts generally to apply, explaining that ‘[t]he common law of torts is, at its 
foundation, a means of apportioning risks and allocating the burden of loss,’ and that in 
addition to the moral and logical components of its analysis, a court must set the compass of 
a duty so that the social consequences of wrongs and exposure to liability are limited to a 
controllable degree.” (quoting Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d 922, 923 
(N.Y. 1987))). 
464 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:449 
 
recovery may not be there. But people will see the situations as similar and assert 
“in justice” a right to recover because of what the defendants did to them.  
Recovery for negligent torts, even when they were indirect, was available in the 
common-law action on the case, because that was a good way of deterring 
accidents and promoting safety. A liability rule was used and operated through 
private recourse. Instead, in the action in trespass (which incidentally is the one that 
John and Ben rely on most for their theory), no recovery was given if the injury 
was indirect. Trespass gave recovery regardless of fault, so long as the injury was 
direct. It did so for corrective justice reasons, I guess, because “[i]f a man suffers 
damage [directly], it is right that he be recompensed.”51 But the action in trespass 
was not interested in deterrence. Why not? If the defendant was faultless, why 
deter? And if the defendant had acted intentionally, tort deterrence was not needed. 
The defendant who had done something criminally wrong was hanged.  
There was, therefore, no precedent giving recovery to plaintiffs who were 
injured intentionally and indirectly. But this seemed unjust to such victims. “If 
recovery is given to victims of indirect, negligent wrongs, it surely should be given 
to me, a victim of an indirect, intentional wrong,” the victim in such a case would 
say. “I have been wronged by you—even more than those injured by negligence. I 
must have a right to recover.”  
It was this situation that gave rise to Scott v. Shepherd,52 one of the classic cases 
in the law of torts. In Scott v. Shepherd, the lighted-squib case, someone seemingly 
did something that was an intentional tort that injured the plaintiff indirectly. 
Ripstein recounts the facts of Scott v. Shepherd: “Shepherd threw a burning squib 
into the market stall of Yates, from which Willis, to protect himself and Yates’s 
goods, threw it into the stall of Ryall, who immediately tossed it away from 
himself. The squib finally exploded in Scott’s stall, costing him his eye.”53 
This situation, not surprisingly, led the court in Scott v. Shepherd to give 
recovery. Did it do so because the existence of recovery for indirect, negligent 
harms had changed what people believed corrective justice required? Did it do so 
because a civil recourse right to recover had come to be? Whatever. By then, the 
underlying reasons for the old rules mattered less than their seeming injustice—and 
the law changed accordingly. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. The Case of the Thorns, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, Mich., pl. 18 (1466) (Eng.), reprinted 
in C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 195, 
196 (1949). 
 52. Scott v. Shepherd, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B.) (comparing trespass and actions 
on the case). In their evolution, the action of trespass remained as the remedy for intentional 
wrongs, and action on the case was extended to include injuries which were not intended but 
were merely negligently inflicted. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 
§ 7 (4th ed. 1971); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1780–1860, at 89 (1977) (“Since the action for trespass was limited to direct injuries, so this 
argument goes, there could be no independent action for negligence until the strict liability—
negligence distinction between trespass and case was obliterated.”). 
 53. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 114 (1999) (telling the 
tort story of Scott v. Shepherd). For my view of this case and its significance to the 
relationship between economic and philosophical theories of torts, see Guido Calabresi, 
Toward a Unified Theory of Torts, J. TORT L., Oct. 2007, at 1, 3–8. 
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The New York case that John cited in his presentation has a similar 
explanation.54 If there is recovery in all sorts of other situations that seem similar, 
why not here? And by the way, that way of thinking affects judges in making the 
ordinary case-by-case decisions far more than broad economic theory. That is why, 
when I have a case like Desiano,55 I am much more likely to talk about torts in a 
civil recourse way, or corrective justice way, than to talk about deeper underlying 
reasons for liability. I talk expectations rather than economics. 
I should add that this notion of how individual expectations have been affected 
by legal rules—how values and tastes have been created, sometimes accidentally, 
as a result of some deeper, broader economic notions—was what was missing from 
my book, The Costs of Accidents, 56 and from many of my original articles. We did 
not talk about tastes and value creation then. But we do talk about them now. Even 
in my earlier writings, I did discuss “other justice concerns.” This was my way of 
saying there were things—like, it turns out, value shaping—that I had probably 
missed, that I had left out.57  
The particular value that civil recourse theory focuses on is one of these values. 
It happens to be a value that is peculiarly American. Whether it is a good value or a 
bad value, I don’t know. Ben speaks of this in his Texas Law Review article where 
he notes that he is not speaking of vengeance.58 Perhaps; I have my doubts. 
Nevertheless, it is a peculiarly American value.  
It has been said that, when the earliest colonists first landed in this country, they 
immediately began to sue each other. Barbara Aronstein Black, the great historian 
of the early colonies,59 said as much to me. “Don’t tread on me” and “Don’t 
infringe on my rights” both reflect deeply held American values. 60  
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Lauer, 733 N.E.2d at 186–89 (ruling that the medical examiner, who learned of 
exonerating evidence that would have cleared the father, owed no duty to a father charged 
with homicide in the death of his infant son). 
 55. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 56. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 6. 
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From this attitude two strands derive. One is America’s great concern with 
individual constitutional rights and liberties. The other sounds like a right to redress 
or even vengeance. I believe the latter helps explain why the United States is one of 
the few developed countries left that still has the death penalty.61 I think we have 
capital punishment not for deterrence or for justice reasons but for the families of 
the person who has been killed who all too often say, “It is my right to get closure, 
to have the person who injured my family pay.” Both strands are part of a very 
American attitude. 
It is not surprising that when the Supreme Court looks at punitive damages, as 
my former law clerk, Tom Colby, pointed out, the Court looks at this tort remedy 
entirely from the vengeance point of view.62 The Court has seemingly said that 
vengeance is the purpose of punitive damages, and hence that such damages must 
be limited by due-process constraints.63 In fact, the Court’s single-minded way of 
looking at punitive damages causes it to miss many other important and economics-
based functions that extracompensatory damages perform in our legal system.64 
The great Judge Posner laid out some such economic reasons for punitive damages 
in an opinion for the court.65 And, in Ciraolo, the great Judge Calabresi stated more 
modestly in a concurring opinion (concurring in his own opinion because he did not 
want to make it a holding) that punitive damages play multiple functions and 
should not be reduced to just one role.66 
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CONCLUSION 
I conclude that there must be something important to Americans in the notion of 
giving individual redress to those who feel wronged. Does this value, however, 
have to be recognized primarily in torts? And is it enough to justify the whole 
structure of torts?  
What would we do if we decided that it was better to handle the other things 
torts does by moving to a New Zealand-style system of compensation?67 Would we 
lose something fundamental by eliminating the direct victim/injurer relationship? 
How important is this relationship, given the almost universal existence of 
insurance? I have my doubts. 
But if it is fundamental, there are, in fact, other torts-related ways of giving 
people the feeling of individual redress, such as noninsurable tort fines based upon 
the injurer’s wealth. Scandinavian countries have already experimented with 
these.68 And the right to individual redress might also be vindicated in areas of the 
law other than the one we currently call torts. It can be recognized in contracts and 
in criminal law as well. (In the latter, for example, this can be done by letting 
victims participate in the criminal adjudication and sentencing process.) To the 
extent that this is a separate value that we wish to preserve, there may be other 
ways of handling it other than through tort law. As a result, should we find our 
existing law of torts too cumbersome or inefficient and move to a system like New 
Zealand’s, I expect we would explore and develop these alternatives.  
On the other hand, the beauty of the common law, which the Supreme Court 
completely misunderstands when it reduces punitive damages to one function, is 
that the common law seeks to achieve any number of very different goals at the 
same time. The common law of torts, occasionally at the microlevel, does what 
John and Ben say it is there to do. Torts also does what Coleman says it does— 
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again, at the microlevel, and on occasion. Torts, however, can also be explained in 
terms of values that are readily recognized as economic-efficiency values but with 
definitions of costs that are anything but simple, Posnerian ones. 
As a result, to look at torts only as John and Ben do is reductionist. Their 
approach doesn’t explain changes in rights that sometimes give rise to civil 
recourse and deny it in other situations. To look at torts solely from Coleman’s 
perspective of corrective justice is reductionist and does not explain changes in 
what is compensatory justice, in what are justified expectations, and in how they 
come about. To look at torts only as the minimizing of the sum of safety costs and 
injury costs is reductionist because it does not explain what, at any given moment, 
we believe to be costs and the relational ways in which we may define costs. It does 
not explain why individuals may demand recourse today in particular situations 
when nonrecourse would be cheaper. It does not explain these things, despite what 
the New York Court of Appeals says is its job—the job of determining duty 
primarily in economic terms.  
Torts is lovely because it includes all of these, but—as I’ve suggested—so do 
contracts and criminal law. What makes torts different is that it does all this by 
letting the collectivity set the price: set what the appropriate (civil) recourse is, set 
what must be paid to allow entitlements to shift. It is that, more than anything else, 
that makes torts different from contracts or criminal law! 
 
